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During a tour of three Central American 
countries last March 24-26, Mexican President 
Vicente Fox formally relaunched the Plan Puebla 
Panama (PPP), which in Mexico had languished for 
a year and a half — dying according to some, dead 
according to others.  After much fanfare during its 
inauguration in the early months of the Fox 
presidency in early 2001, the PPP suffered, if not a 
premature death, then a prolonged paralysis in 
terms of actions that officially pertained to it, as 
well as a long silence from government offices 
regarding its true intent and probable future. 
 
This essay will review briefly the PPP’s 
evolution over the past three years, the opposition it 
has provoked among civil society of Mesoamerica, 
the PPP’s new designer image created with the help 
of marketing experts, and, in conclusion, the 
lessons that the PPP has taught grassroots 
movements for the immediate future.  Given the 
numerous and excellent analyses on the PPP1, we 
will not delve into its components here. 
 
The PPP is hatched and  
nearly dies within a year 
 
According to Fox, the objective of the PPP is to 
overcome the existing underdevelopment of a 
particularly poor part of the American continent, 
that of the nine southeastern states of Mexico and 
the seven Central American republics. This area has 
scarce private and public investment, and its socio-
economic indicators are above only those of Haiti 
and Bolivia in this hemisphere.2  
 
Fox draws on concepts that were in vogue half a 
century ago stating that “underdevelopment” is 
attributable to a lack of inputs, principally 
technology and capital.  The PPP is designed, then, 
to build, or improve, large infrastructure projects 
(toll highways, airports, deep-water ports, electrical 
and telecommunications grids), that, together with 
on-going projects (hydroelectric dams, “dry” trans-
isthmus canals), would motivate large private 
companies to locate there.  It is their presence 
(together with the capital, technology and jobs that 
they bring) that will supposedly lead to 
“development.” In order to stimulate these 
decisions, PPP infrastructure projects are designed 
to overcome the bottlenecks that might cut into 
companies’ profits3. 
 
Fox’s PPP is not, however, a new agenda, but 
rather a handy “conceptual umbrella” that brings 
together several large projects that have been 
ongoing, or in the pipeline, for years.  The Plan 
tries to link infrastructure projects in Mexico’s 
southeast with those of its Central American 
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neighbors, in order to jump-start the region’s 
insertion into corporate globalization. 
 
Yet this “developmentalist” vision has long 
been questioned, both by new theories as well as 
on-the-ground practice, since it downplays the 
structural problems of underdevelopment related to 
concentration of economic and political power in 
the hands of elites and the corresponding lack of 
opportunities for the majority. 
 
Early on, it was clear to civil society in Mexico 
and Central America that the infrastructure projects 
scheduled under the PPP were not concerned with 
social development.  Today civil society is rejecting 
the notion that “development” is the exclusive 
reserve of bureaucrats and the private sector.  
Development for whom, with whose money, to 
benefit whom, and with decisions taken by whom, 
are the questions that civil society is asking today. 
 
Plainly put, it’s also a question of democracy.  If 
a good part of the funding is to come from public 
coffers, and if loans granted, plus interest, are to be 
repaid through taxpayer contributions, then an 
informed civil society should have a say in deciding 
on “development” done supposedly on its behalf. 
 
The PPP area covers approximately one million 
square kilometers and 65 million people in eight 
countries, around 50% of whom are classified as 
being in extreme poverty.4  Contrary to the 
impoverishment of its inhabitants, the area is rich in 
natural resources (water, timber, oil, gas, various 
minerals, plentiful biodiversity) and well suited for 
generating hydroelectric power.  For inhabitants of 
the PPP area, the Plan was yet another neocolonial 
form of extracting its natural wealth and exploiting 
the cheap and abundant labor force of its 
population.  It was also easy to detect the PPP’s 
conceptual links to other large-scale neoliberal 
plans to promote corporate interests in the region, 
particularly the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the 
Americas), a continent-wide counterpart of NAFTA 
(North American Free Trade Agreement). 
 
The PPP was born with several additional 
problems, not the least of which was its antiquated 
notion that people, especially the poor, are objects 
of “development”, never its subjects.  The PPP’s 
creators, bureaucrats at the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and the 
Mexican government, hammered out the scheme 
without so much as a single consultation to measure 
people’s feelings on the matter.  Second, the PPP 
ignored not only the opinion, but also the make-up 
of the people who inhabit the region, particularly 
the specific circumstances of the indigenous people 
who, over millennia, have lived therein. 
 
Third, and most important, the PPP’s promoters 
underestimated the rejection that the Plan would 
encounter among large sectors of the region’s 
population.  Two months after the official launch of 
the PPP, Mesoamerican civil society already had 
held its first regional gathering to analyze the Plan.  
In May 2001, over 300 representatives of 
Mesoamerican civil society met in Tapachula, 
Chiapas to exchange information, create or 
strengthen relationships and networks, and begin to 
think about activities and alternatives.  The PPP 
was, and continues to be, one of the most important 
catalysts that can make Mexicans and Central 
Americans stop thinking and operating solely in 
their own worlds, separated in their planning and 
organization by a recent history of differentiated 
grassroots struggles.                                                           
 4 Colegio de Mexico professor Julio Boltvinik, one of the 
country’s leading researchers on poverty estimates the 
“indigence index” in the Mexico portion of the PPP as 65.8%, 
defining indigent as that part of the population that can cover 
less than half of the minimum norms of income and basic needs, 
calculated on the basis of family income and living conditions 
(housing, services in the home, access to health, education, free 
time and basic belongings). See “Planes, desigualdad y pobreza” 
in La Jornada, June 22, 2001, available online at 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2001/jun01/010622/022a1eco.html
. Boltvinik calculates the index by means of the “Integrated 
Poverty Measuring Method”, a full explanation of which is 
available in Julio Boltvinik and Enrique Hernández Laos, 
Pobreza y distribución del ingreso en México, Siglo XXI, 
Mexico City, 1999. See also Armando Bartra, “Sur: megaplanes 
y utopías en la América equinoccial” in Mesoamérica: los ríos 
profundos, A. Bartra (coord), Instituto Maya, Mexico City, 2001, 
p.29: “In Central America 78% of the population lives in poverty 
and 60% in extreme poverty, rising to 70% in Honduras and 
Guatemala.  The data are from 1990 and if we compare them 
with those from 10 years previous we see that the percentage of 
poor people dropped by 7 points while those in misery increased 
by 13 points, in other words the social basement is quickly 
expanding in population”. 
The PPP made it evident that corporate 
globalization, of which it forms a part, is the same 
everywhere, and therefore it behooved grassroots 
groups to respond as one.  Since the Tapachula 
meeting, this regional gathering (now called “With 
Globalization the People Come First”) has been 
held in three Central American cities, with greater 
participation every time.  The next encounter will 
be held in July 2004 in San Salvador.  The PPP was 
also a catalyst and motive for several other regional 
and topic-based gatherings.  There have been 
forums on dams, biodiversity, water, agrotoxins, 
genetically-modified substances, militarization, 
autonomy, grassroots economics and others.  It has 
also sparked local, national and regional 
coordinating bodies against the PPP and 
neoliberalism. In Chiapas, for example, the Chiapas 
Gathering on Neoliberalism was formed in October 
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2002, charged with the task of not only resisting the 
PPP and neoliberalism but also coming up with 
alternatives.  In Mexico, in March 2002 the 
Mexican Alliance for People’s Self-Determination 
(AMAP) was created by uniting dozens of 
organizations in the nine-state area covered by the 
PPP.  AMAP networks work with similar 
nationwide coordinating bodies in Central America 
and with anti-neoliberal groups throughout the 
hemisphere. 
The nature of the opposition—multisectoral, 
multiclass, multinational, and growing— led to a 
noticeable disheartening of the Fox administration 
towards its much-touted PPP, which led to several 
political measures.  In 2002, the head office of the 
PPP was banished from the Office of the 
Presidency to a subsecretariate in the Secretary of 
Foreign Relations, which, at first, alleged lacking 
the funds to even house the new office.  Likewise, 
the first coordinator, the controversial Florencio 
Salazar was fired, and later accused of the “erratic 
and inaccurate information” disseminated on the 
PPP in its first year.6  A moratorium on official 
declarations on the PPP was declared, and the 
Plan’s web site, the only official source of 
information reasonably accessible to the public, 
disappeared.  Thus the PPP entered a sort of limbo, 
since Mexican bureaucrats didn’t deny its 
existence, but they said nothing about it, and 
generated no public information. 
 
Grassroots activism throughout the PPP area 
soon led the Fox government to backpedal.  Elitist 
in its origin, undemocratic in its implementation, 
promoter of corporate interests, exclusive of social 
concerns, particularly of indigenous people, the 
PPP’s nature was enough to stoke the embers of 
grassroots resistance.  In early 2001, when the PPP 
was little more than a declaration of intent from the 
Fox transition team, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation) had already declared its 
opposition, renewed in July 2003 by 
Subcommander Marcos, “At the very least in the 
mountains of southeastern Mexico, its 
implementation will not be permitted for any 
reason.”5 
 
Another factor dampened the Plan’s aspirations: 
in spite of the publicity that was stirred up by the 
fanfare at the PPP’s inauguration, it was unable to 
obtain the financing that the government sought.  
There were several reasons: the plunge of the 
Mexican (and world) economy after September 11, 
the refusal of the IDB to grant financing to the 
Mexican government for the PPP at the preferential 
rates conceded to the Central American countries 
for the same purpose, in addition to the 
contractionary effects brought by reductions to the 
Mexican government’s budget when the economy 
failed to grow and the country entered a recession.  
Funding from the private sector also failed to 
appear. 
 
Concurrently with the mobilization and 
organization that the PPP stirred up in southeast 
Mexico and Central America, a struggle broke out 
among the campesinos (communal farmers) in 
Atenco, some 10 miles northeast of Mexico City, 
when in October 2001 President Fox expropriated 
15 thousand hectares (37 thousand acres) of their 
land in order to build a new airport for the country’s 
capital.  The nine-month struggle that ensued as 
campesinos defended the lands won through the 
“blood shed by our grandparents” in the Mexican 
revolution 90 years before was an example of what 
grassroots organization, resistance and mobilization 
could achieve, even in the face of billion-dollar 
megaprojects.  When the Atenco struggle ended in 
victory for the campesinos, with the government 
rescinding the expropriation order in August 2002, 
it became clear that Fox’s schemes of 
“development,” through megaprojects by 
imposition and decree, would never work.  The 
option most feared, violence from police forces, 
was eschewed by the government, given Fox’s 
image, curried abroad as a reformer, in addition to 
the unforeseeable consequences it would bring, and 
the uncertainty that it would provoke among 
foreign investors. 
 
Forced to face reality, the government 
downsized its expectations, since it would now 
have to finance the infrastructure projects in 
Mexico with the country’s own funds and/or 
through funding already obtained elsewhere.  But 
no fresh funds were forthcoming, neither from 
private or multilateral banks, nor from other 
potential sources, such as the European Union, in 
which Fox held high hopes in 2002. 
 
During about a year and a half (June 2002-
November 2003), publicity on the PPP was 
virtually frozen, since signaling an infrastructure 
project was tantamount to mobilizing civil society 
against it and risking it being blocked, delayed or 
even cancelled—which, in fact, occurred on several 
occasions throughout the PPP’s territory.  The  
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interim strategy, while another was being designed, 
was to proceed with the infrastructure projects to 
the extent that financial and social considerations 
allowed, but to not call attention to them.  Once 
finished and inaugurated, the projects could be 
attributed to the PPP, much as Fox did during his 
recent tour of Central America. 
 
The PPP’s new publicity strategy 
 
During this year-and-a-half freeze, the PPP’s 
“new image” was being designed.  It was first 
necessary to quell the opposition among the 
governors of the states participating in the PPP, 
who had unleashed criticism due to the “great 
misinformation,” the delays in financing, the 
“centralism” with which it had been designed, and 
the “marginalization to which they had been 
subjected in the decision-making process.”7 
 
In fact, in April 2003, the governor of Oaxaca, 
José Murat, declared that the PPP “is rotten,” and 
“only exists in the imagination of those who are 
given to drawing up projects with propagandistic 
purposes.”8  At the official launching of Mexico’s 
portion of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor9, 
in March of the same year, the governor of Chiapas, 
Pablo Salazar, withheld his state’s participation in 
the MBC until its links to the “controversial PPP” 
could be cleared up.10 
 
In response, a few months later the Secretary of 
Foreign Relations, Luis Ernesto Derbez, called 
together the eight governors in an effort to align 
them by creating a “coordinating commission,” 
whose public role would be to oversee meetings 
and agreements between the federal and state 
governments, but also, we suspect, to unite 
declarations.  The governors suppressed their 
disagreement, and even the rebellious Murat said 
afterwards that it was “indispensable to maintain 
the [PPP] as it presently is, in order for it to receive 
financing from international organizations.”11 
 
Nine months later, in March 2004, the Mexican 
government sought the same show of unity at the 
6th Meeting of the Tuxtla Mechanism with the 
Central American presidents.  One of the reasons 
for the meeting, according to Marcelo Antinori, 
PPP coordinator at the IDB in Washington, was to 
“seek consensus on the PPP with the presidents.”12  
The absence of four of the seven Central American 
leaders was interpreted in various ways, but Fox’s 
declarations put the accent on the unity of economic 
interests between Mexicans and Central Americans. 
 
The next step was to create a friendlier image of 
the PPP.  The IDB called in the U.S.-based 
advertising agency Fleishman-Hillard for the 
purpose, for a fee said to have been close to one 
million dollars.  On the basis of its 
recommendations, the strategy consisted in raising 
the profile of declarations having to do with social 
aspects, particularly with regard to indigenous 
peoples and the need to hold public consultations 
on the Plan.  For example, in Guatemala Fox 
recently declared, “The PPP is a regional 
development process which has to do mainly with 
people, families and, particularly, with indigenous 
communities”.  Days later, before the Central 
American leaders in Managua, he would declare: 
 
We are united by concrete development plans 
and projects, in which our indigenous 
communities participate in their design and 
application.  In Mexico, for example, we have 
held more than fifty direct consultations of 36 
indigenous peoples, since we want development 
without discrimination, a balanced and just 
development, with a human face, development 
that respects the culture and practices of these 
communities.13 
 
                                                          
                                                          
7 “Modificarán la SRE y gobernadores el PPP,” Proceso, June 
27, 2003. 
8 “Lanza Murat dura crítica contra el PPP,” El Universal, 
Mexico City, April 4, 2003, p.18. 
9 “The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor is a regional initiative 
that seeks to conserve biological diversity and ecosystems in a 
way that promotes sustainable social and economic 
development.” Translated from the MBC’s web page at 
www.biomeso.net (Spanish only).  See also the Mexico section 
of the MBC at 
http://www.conabio.gob.mx/institucion/corredor/doctos/index.ht
ml or search the World Bank’s web site, www.worldbank.org for 




Notwithstanding the speeches, there is no record 
in Mexico of these “consultations” on the PPP or 
any “concrete development plan” designed and 
implemented by indigenous people in Mexico.14  It 
is true, however, that the Mexican government is 
holding consultations with indigenous 
communities, through the offices of the National 
11 “Plantea Derbez ‘relanzar’ el PPP,” El Universal, June 27, 
2003, p.14. 
12 InterAction, “Reunión entre ONG y IDB-PPP,” February 12, 
2004, p.13.  Available at http://www.interaction.org/idb/ppp. 
13 Sistema Internet de la Presidencia, declarations of Fox in 
Managua, March 25, 2004. 
14 César Bustamante of the IDB in Mexico City stated in an 
interview granted to Luca Martinelli of the University of Pisa on 
March 12, 2004 that the Mexican government had not to date 
held even one consultation on the PPP. 
10 “Causa controversia inicio del Corredor Biológico,” El 
Universal, Mexico City, March 4, 2003, p.12. 
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Commission for the Development of Indigenous 
Peoples (Conadepi), at the behest of the Secretary 
of Foreign Relations.  But these consultations are 
“rigged,” according to Gabriela Rangel of the 
Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC), 
since the Commission makes no reference to the 
PPP in its convocations and thus participants arrive 
unprepared to debate the matter in full.  The nature 
of the consultations, unfortunately, does not seem 
to have changed, since indigenous people continue 
to receive the customary treatment of passive 
recipients of what are little more than Power Point 
presentations.15 
 
Another aspect of the new image is the removal 
of the most controversial projects from the PPP, 
which are instead classified as “secondary 
projects.”  The most notorious example in this 
regard is the construction of dams.  
Notwithstanding the undeniable interest of the 
Mexican government in building dams on the 
Usumacinta River,16 which straddles Chiapas and 
Guatemala, the official line from the PPP is to deny 
that the Plan has anything to do with dams.  
Similarly, the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, 
at first part of the PPP, has since been separated, 
since the MBC hopes to promote “sustainable 
ecological development,” while the PPP only 
wanted to incorporate the MBC as its “green arm” 
for what is basically a “project of cementification”, 
according to Tania Carrasco, specialist in social 
development at the World Bank in Mexico City.17 
 
The pronounced drop in the federal 
government’s budget for the PPP (from US$677 
million in 2002 to US$78 million in 2004, a 
decrease of 88.5%),18 coincides with the relabeling 
of certain projects, in addition to the general 
reductions carried out by the Secretary of the 
Treasury (SHCP).  Certain construction projects 
may no longer be contained in the PPP, but they 
continue to advance, since funds are simply 
channeled to the respective ministry in charge. 
 
Officially, for the entire PPP region, what is the 
total budget and what aspects are included?  
Unfortunately there is still little clarity.  The 
Mexican government handles a total figure of 
US$4.4 billion, but it is far too low, according to 
InterAction, a Washington-based NGO, which 
calculates that US$10 billion would be needed over 
ten years, based on projects already approved and 
in the pipeline.19  Officially, there are 28 
megaprojects for the eight components of the PPP, 
listed below.  (The percentage of funds from the 
total budget assigned to each component appears in 
parenthesis): 
 
1— Highways (85.2% of the total budget) 
2— Electrical interconnection (11.1%) 
3— Promotion of tourism (1.3%) 
4— Human development (0.8%) 
5— Prevention and mitigation of disasters (0.7%) 
6— Trade facilitation (0.6%) 
7— Sustainable development (0.4%) 
8— Integration of telecommunication services 
(0.03%)20 
 
                                                          
                                                          
The amounts budgeted for each component 
demonstrate the emphasis placed by the PPP, today 
and since its inception, on the construction of 
highways to connect especially strategic or 
sensitive areas in Mexico and Central America.  
One of them is the Atlantic Corridor that runs 
around the Gulf of Mexico, site of some of the 
largest oil and gas reserves in the region.  By means 
of this Atlantic highway corridor the region is due 
to be linked to the United States by modern toll 
roads, to be concessioned to private companies.  
Similarly, the second most important component, 
electrical interconnection or SIEPAC (System of 
Electrical Integration for the Countries of Central 
America), will in the end create one integrated 
15 After one such consultation in Juchitán, Oaxaca in December 
2003, the Coordinator for the Defense and Territory of the 
Indigenous People of the Isthmus declared “The first phase of 
this consultation, convoked by Conadepi, the Secretary of 
Indigenous Affairs and the Development Planning Commission, 
has shown that it does not respond to the authentic concerns for 
the wellbeing of the indigenous peoples, but rather it is a 
disguised “poll” on the acceptability of development models 
planned for the needs of large multinational corporations who 
seek to control world trade by means of diverse trade treaties and 
agreements, be these the Plan Millenium, the Escalera Náutica, 
or the Plan Puebla Panama.  [...]  We believe that Condadepi’s 
role should be to contribute to establishing a political 
relationship of respect with the indigenous people and cease 
using the disguise of indigenism.” Source: Communiqué from 
the Coordinator, December 17, 2003. 
18 Calculated based on “El PPP en el Proyecto de Presupuesto de 
Egresos de 2004” by José Alberto García Ponce, advisor to the 
Chamber of Deputies, LIX Legislature, November 2004.  García 
calculated his figures using (real) 2004 pesos, which we have 
converted to dollars at US$1 = MX$11.  Figures include both 
Program 75—Development of the South-Southeast Region and 
Program 77—Plan Puebla Panama from the Mexican federal 
budget. 
16 “This is the greatest of rivers in Mexico” and it flows through 
“an underdeveloped, impoverished part of the country.  If we 
work together responsibly, we can help the region, not hurt it,” 
Julio Acosta, coordinator of hydroelectric projects for the 
Mexican CFE (Federal Electricity Commission), told the New 
York Times, September 22, 2002, “Mexico Weighs Electricity 
Against History”. 
19 See “Supplemental E-Bulletin” by InterAction, April 2002, at 
http://www.interaction.org/files.cgi/539_PPP_Supplement_Upda
te.pdf. 
17 Interviewed by Luca Martinelli of the University of Pisa, 
March 9, 2004. 




energy grid from Canada to Panama, to facilitate 
the sale of electricity to, principally, the “energy-
starved U.S. economy.”21 
 
Yet the grid will not stop in Panama.  
Colombian president Alvaro Uribe recently 
expressed interest in having Colombia’s electrical 
grid linked to the PPP’s.  The president’s wit led 
him to suggest that the PPP’s initials should now 
mean “Plan Puebla Putumayo,” for the country’s 
southern-most province.  “We want total integration 
of Colombia into the Plan Puebla Panama,” Uribe 
said.  “This would begin with the electrical 
interconnection line between Colombia and 
Panama, whose initial studies will be made 
available to us in April [2004], and the second 
project would be the construction of a gas pipeline, 
with the expectation that not only Colombia should 
be joined to Panama, but also to Venezuela.  This is 
necessary in order to link the continent from the 
United States to the Patagonia.”22 
 
Can the Plan Puebla Patagonia be far away ? 
 
In summary, the PPP’s new image cannot hide 
the obvious: in essence, nothing has changed. 
Perhaps there will be some adjustments in 
presentation, with renewed interest in projecting an 
image of unity, openness, transparency, and 
decisions made by consensus with civil society.  
But the basic fact remains—it continues to be a 
custom- designed initiative for big-money interests 
and, as we shall see further on, for strategic 
interests of the United States.  An enormous effort 
founded on a now discredited theory that makes 
“development” synonymous with abundant 
infrastructure. 
 
It is prudent, however, to predict that there will 
be, in fact, greater openness, transparency, 
consultations, but lacking in substance.  The 
expression of grassroots discontent and rejection 
will persist, but today the task before the Plan’s 
administrators will be to channel it towards vacuous 
and innocuous exercises.  Perhaps an amusing 
example in this regard is the Mexican government’s 
web page on the PPP, available on the Internet once 
again after a year-and-a-half absence 
(http://ppp.sr.gob.mex/index.php) with, obviously, 
a virtual forum, where visitors can express their 
opinions on the PPP. Unsurprisingly, opinions left 
therein are largely critical of the PPP, but can there 
be any doubt that this channel of expression, along 
with the “real” consultations held with civil society, 
indigenous people, women, will change absolutely 
nothing? 
 
Will the PPP survive Fox’s six-year mandate?  
Sources close to the government have opposing 
opinions.  César Bustamante, in charge of the PPP 
at the IDB offices in Mexico City, believes it will, 
not only in Central America, but also in Mexico.  
However, this does not imply a change in the real 
importance it would have for Mexico, since the 
Plan today has changed into “more of a political 
mechanism for economic and energy integration.”  
On the other hand, Fernando Cuevas, head of the 
Energy Unit at the UN’s ECLAC (Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) 
office in Mexico City, says that the PPP is “Fox’s 
idea that will fall apart at the close of his 
administration.”  There is no one behind it, Cuevas 
believes, not in his party, not in his government.  
But the PPP will continue in Central America, 
because it was there that the IDB put its money.  In 
Mexico, it will continue only for those companies 
who win contracts, for example to build highways 
in Panama, Cuevas concludes.23 
 
Lessons from the PPP 
for the grassroots movement 
 
The PPP Coordinator at the IDB Marcelo 
Antinori said it clearly last February: “Now it is 
more explicit that the PPP means Mesoamerican 
Economic Integration.”24  He was seconded by 
Harry Brautigam, president of the Central 
American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE): 
“For the BCIE, the PPP means an indispensable 
compliment for the economic expansion of the 
region and a platform to prepare Central America 
for its entry into the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA).”25 
 
Not surprisingly, the declarations are identical 
to what the Plan’s opponents pointed out three 
years ago: the PPP cannot be separated from the 
logic behind economic integration plans for the 
region, and the world, as conceived by the 
ideologues of neoliberalism, be they NAFTA, 
FTAA or the WTO. 
 
                                                                                                                    
It is on these wider concerns that the grassroots 
movements will have to focus, especially in regards 
to disseminating information and awareness to 
greater sectors of the population.  The specific 
21 Alejandro Alvarez Béjar, “México en el siglo XXI: ¿hacia una 
comunidad de Norteamérica?” Memoria, Mexico City, No. 162, 
August 2003, available at 
23 Both Bustamante and Cuevas were interviewed by Luca 
Martinelli, University of  Pisa, March 11-12, 2004. 
24 InterAction, February 12, 2004, Ibid. 
25 “NotiCen”, Latin America Data Base, University of New 
Mexico, April 1, 2004, Vol. 9, No. 13. 
http://ww.memoria.com.mx/162/alvarez.htm  
22 “Plantea Colombia sumarse al PPP,” Reforma, Mexico City, 
  




                                                          
details behind the PPP, whether one project or 
another is contained therein, whether the budget has 
risen or fallen, are relatively less important, in the 
face of the threat posed by neoliberalism’s concept 
of development and view of the future. 
 
The threat of such a vision, the struggles that 
await Latin American civil society, and the 
challenges for grassroots activists and educators in 
creating awareness on these topics goes beyond the 
PPP, NAFTA or the FTAA. The larger problem, 
mainly for our sovereignty as nations, perhaps 
resides in the “deep integration” with the United 
States that is presently being prepared by elites.  
Mexico and Canada are on the front line. Deep 
integration as an idea has been making the rounds 
among strategists since at least the beginning of this 
century. Fox picked up on it after his election, 
called the idea “NAFTA-plus” and sent up 
conceptual trial balloons.26  It has been well debated 
in Canada, at least in academic circles27. It picked 
up new meaning after the September 11, 2001 
attacks, with the “double-time” incorporation of 
Mexico and Canada into the U.S. armed forces’ 
Northern Command. 
 
At its simplest, deep integration means the 
creation of a new space, the “North American 
continent,” where Mexico, Canada, and the United 
States would be integrated, obviously under the 
tutelage of the latter.  Apart from a single North 
American military force, there would be a common 
border, a single currency, homogeneity in 
economic, security, migration and refugee policies, 
a single identification card, i.e., the fusion in almost 
all respects of the three countries.  The Mexican 
economist Alejandro Alvarez says that “the 
Community of North America is the single greatest 
challenge for Mexico in the 21st century.”28  
Certainly part of Canadian civil society has 
understood the meaning of “deep integration” and 
26 Robert Pastor published in August 2001 one of the most 
complete books on deep integration, Towards a North American 
Community. Pastor is a close friend of Jorge G. Castañeda, 
advisor to Fox during his election campaign in 1999-2000, and 
his Secretary of Foreign Relations during two years. 
27 In October 2003, the Centre for Research on Latin America 
and the Caribbean (CERLAC) at York University and the 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) held a public 
forum on “Canada, Free Trade and Deep Integration in North 
America: Revitalizing Democracy, Upholding the Public Good”, 
at York University in Toronto.  Contact Ricardo Grinspun 
(ricardo@yorku.ca) for Conference papers.  See also the Council 
of Canadian’s web site, www.canadians.org, for an essay by 
Maude Barlow on “deep integration” in “The Canada We Want”, 
as well as information on a 7-city tour of Canada by the Council 
in March 2004 on “Colony of Country?: The Future of Canada-
US Relations”. 
28 Alejandro Alvarez Béjar, Ibid. 
has sounded the alarm, in a still weak and incipient 
manner, to Canadians. 
 
The same needs to be done in Mexico and the 
rest of Latin America.  The PPP’s real intentions 
are a good basis to alert civil society to the impact 
that it will have on our lives in the short term, but 
linking it, through grassroots education, to the 
future awaiting all of us under neoliberalism is 
perhaps the most urgent task at hand. 
